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Raise the Seawalls: Local Governments & Flood Protection
Abstract
Rising seas and more frequent and severe storms are increasing the risks and costs of flooding. Using
2009-2018 data for the U.S. state of Florida from FEMA’s Community Rating System program (CRS),
which scores participating local governments on their flood risk mitigation activities: I study (1) whether
increasing flood risks have led to increases in program participation and score among Florida towns and
cities; (2) what risk, fiscal, and demographic factors are driving local governments to invest in CRSrecognized flood risk mitigation measures; and (3) the association between CRS measures and home
values.
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1. Introduction
Flood events are the costliest natural disasters in the United States, causing
significant annual losses to individuals, business, properties, and infrastructure.
According to the National Weather Service’s (NWS) Annual Flood Loss Summary
Reports, floods accounted for 1,130 fatalities and over $104 billion in damages
from 2007 to 2018 (NWS, 2007-2018). Furthermore, due to more intensive
floodplain development and the effects of climate change, the annual costs of
flooding are increasing – Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) data
on “significant flood events” (events resulting in 1,500 or more insurance-paid
losses) indicates that floods between 2006 and 2016 resulted in $20.6 billion in
insurance-paid losses, compared to $7.3 billion from 1994 to 2004 (FEMA, 2019).
Along the coasts, the already considerable risks and costs posed by floods
and storms will be multiplied in coming decades, as rising seas threaten
communities and infrastructure.
According to the United Nations’
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Special Report on the Ocean
and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, global mean sea levels are projected to rise
1.4 to 2.8 feet relative to 1985-2005 levels by 2100, depending on the emissions
scenario (IPCC, 2019). Localized rates of sea level rise will vary widely. Along
the Eastern Seaboard of the United States, a slowing Gulf Stream, shifts in weather
patterns, and effects from El Niño climate cycles are contributing to faster rates of
sea level rise, with some communities reporting annual rises from 2011 to 2015
more than three times higher than the global mean rate (Morrison, 2018; Valle‐
Levinson et al., 2017).
Rising seas are already affecting daily life in these communities, with
“sunny day flooding” – high tides pushing seawater into low-lying areas – posing
a growing problem for local governments and residents. Miami, FL has seen a
more than 400% increase in such flood events since 2006; Boston recorded 19 high
tide flooding days in 2018 (Wdowinski et al., 2016; Page, 2019). In addition to
tidal flooding, the frequency and severity of storms and hurricanes is increasing,
with a “100-year” storm surge event projected to become a “10-year” event by 2050
(a 1% annual probability increasing to a 10% probability) and average and extreme
rainfall totals increasing (Tebaldi et al., 2012; Patricola & Wehner, 2018).
The growing frequency of sunny day flooding and the growing risks from
more frequent and severe storms are contributing to lower home values and
disruptions to economic activity. According to an analysis by McAlpine and Porter
(2018), the Miami-Dade, FL metropolitan area lost over $465 million in real-estate
value between 2005 and 2016, as tidal flooding and sea level rise contributed to
slower appreciation in home prices in at-risk areas. Per Hino et al. (2019),
businesses in downtown Annapolis, MD lost as much as $172,000 in revenue in
2017, as repeat tidal flooding events contributed to lower visits and dollars spent.
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Looking forward, according to a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists
(2018), more than 300,000 homes, with a collective valuation of $117.5 billion, are
at risk of regular flooding by 2045, and properties worth more than $1 trillion could
be at risk by 2100.
In the face of these numbers, some local governments are acting, investing
hundreds of millions of dollars in engineering solutions to safeguard property and
infrastructure, implementing stricter building codes, and increasing public
awareness of flood risks. The city of Miami Beach, Florida, home to an estimated
$5.7 billion in residential property at risk of regular flooding by 2050 (Climate
Central), is investing $650 million in improving drainage systems, elevating roads
and public seawalls, installing pumps to replace gravity-based stormwater pipes,
and re-nourishing beaches. Additionally, the city has made policy and regulatory
changes, such as requiring all new buildings and seawalls to meet increased
elevation requirements. Funding for these resiliency investments, spread over a 15year interval, comes from a combination of special bond measures secured through
a tripling of local stormwater fees, a general obligation bond secured through
property tax increases, and tax increment financing (Plastrik, 2019).
Charleston, South Carolina, where local sea level has risen 1.07 feet over
the past century, is also a leader in flood and sea level rise resiliency planning and
investment. The city’s 2019 “Flooding and Sea Level Rise Strategy” requires all
new and substantially improved structures to be elevated 2 feet above the “100year” flood stage, and the plan calls for the city to acquire and demolish repeatedly
flooded structures. Major infrastructure investments in the plan, totaling $512
million, include drainage improvements, stormwater pumps, and higher seawalls.
Funding comes from local stormwater fees and hospitality taxes, with the city
tapping FEMA Hazard Mitigation Assistance funds for property acquisitions.
Similarly, Hoboken, New Jersey’s “Resist, Delay, Store, Discharge” plan includes
a $230 million investment in pumps and coastal flood hazard mitigation projects,
including a new park along the Hudson River that doubles as a system of storm
surge levees. Funding comes from federal Hurricane Sandy recovery dollars,
infrastructure and park grants from the state, local bonds, and partnerships with real
estate developers (Plastrik, 2019).
A few common themes emerge from these examples of local government
efforts to adapt to climate change and rising flood risks: the political impetus for
investment and planning generally comes from local political leaders and activists,
and funding sources are usually local. Federal funding for such projects is limited,
as there are few nationwide frameworks for boosting flood resiliency proactively
or for addressing climate change (Morrison, 2019).1 The two examples of federal

1

FEMA launched the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) program in
August 2020 (after the submission of this thesis), which makes $500 million available to states
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funds discussed above – Charleston’s use of FEMA Hazard Mitigation grants and
Hoboken’s tapping of federal Hurricane Sandy recovery funds – were only made
possible after the two cities experienced hurricane impacts (in Charleston’s case,
Hurricane Joaquin in 2015 and Hurricane Matthew in 2016).
Are the examples of Miami Beach, Charleston, and Hoboken reflective of a
larger trend whereby cities and towns across the country are responding to rising
climate risks by investing in flood risk mitigation measures? Relatedly, since most
such investment is made (and funded) locally, what are the characteristics of the
towns and cities that are taking these proactive (and expensive) measures? Pumps,
new drainage systems, and higher streets and seawalls all carry hefty price tags,
which means that smaller and poorer towns may not have the resources to afford
these measures. Finally, in communities that are making these investments, are
home prices rising, much in the same way they do in response to higher quality
schools or lower crime, and do those changes differ by flood risk or income level?
In this thesis, I review prior literature on flood prevention, present an
economic framework explaining how flood prevention investments may relate to
home values, and then examine these questions using data for the state of Florida
from 2009 to 2018. I compile a panel data set combining information from FEMA’s
Community Rating System (CRS), which scores participating local governments
on their flood risk mitigation activities, with datasets on city-level characteristics,
fiscal capacity, tax rates, and spending on other public goods. Using regression
analysis, I find that investments in public flood risk mitigation are increasing over
time, with an 11.8% increase in CRS program participation and a 19.8% increase
in average “active” CRS scores among Florida municipalities from 2009-2018.
This increase in active scores suggests that local governments in Florida are
investing more in stormwater systems and flood protection infrastructure, setting
stricter building codes, and acquiring and demolishing at-risk properties. As may
be expected, CRS program participation is significantly related to flood risk, higher
population density, higher median income, and more owner-occupied homes.
Active CRS scores are also highest in the cities with more land area in flood zones
and higher populations. However, in contrast to standard economic theories, cities
with higher scores are also those with greater inequality, lower population densities,
lower median incomes, and less financial capacity. Meanwhile, the cities with the
greatest increases in score from 2009-2018 have less land area in flood zones,
higher debt loads, and lower inequality. Using panel estimation with city-level
fixed effects, I find that participation in the CRS program is positively but not
statistically significant related to median home values, with a point estimate of an
increase of $3,580 to $5,680. Active CRS scores are negatively related to home
values, with every 100-point increase associated with a $6,250 decrease in values
and local governments for mitigation activities. This program is the first example of a large-scale
pre-disaster mitigation fund from the federal government.
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in an average community. I find evidence for less negative (or positive) effects in
communities with more land area in flood zones and higher median incomes.
These results suggest program participation may be driven by factors
different from those influencing higher “active” CRS scores. While the CRS
program is adequately incentivizing some higher flood risk communities to invest
in active CRS mitigation measures, even if they have fewer financial resources, the
program does not appear to be adequately targeting and incentivizing denser
communities with potentially higher mitigation costs to invest in these measures.
Finally, housing markets do not appear to value these flood risk mitigation
measures, suggesting that the costs to local communities may exceed the
(perceived) benefits or that these measures are themselves indicators of flood risk.
2. Background
This research builds on the broader literatures on the determinants of public
expenditure decisions, governmental adoption and implementation of risk
mitigation measures, housing market responses to public goods provision, and the
economic costs of climate change by examining FEMA’s Community Rating
System (CRS). The CRS is a voluntary incentive program for local governments
that encourages and rates community flood management activities that exceed those
required for participation in the National Flood Insurance Program (FEMA, 2017).
2.1.

The National Flood Insurance Program

The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), enacted by the U.S.
Congress in 1968, is the primary tool used by the federal government to promote
flood risk management and flood recovery. Congress established the program with
multiple objectives in mind:
•
•
•
•
•

Ensure the affordability of flood insurance premiums
Increase flood risk awareness through risk-based premiums
Secure widespread participation in the program by communities and
property owners
Earn premium income that would – over time – cover all program expenses
Stem the rising cost of taxpayer-funded flood disaster relief (National
Research Council, 2015)

As currently structured, the NFIP is a joint venture between the federal government,
state and local governments, and private insurers. In addition to setting floodinsurance premiums, issuing policies, and paying policy claims, the federal
government is responsible for producing detailed flood risk maps for premium-
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setting and risk communication purposes. FEMA, which oversees the NFIP, also
offers grant programs in support of pre-disaster risk mitigation and post-disaster
recovery efforts (National Research Council, 2015). State governments exercise
regulatory authority over insurance contracts within their borders, and local
governments can only opt into the federal insurance program if they adopt adequate
minimum floodplain management regulations. Private insurers market and sell
policies and adjust flood claims on behalf of the federal government, but all risk is
fully underwritten by the federal government (Li and Landry, 2018).
The structure of the NFIP has led to shortcomings, including low rates of
insurance take-up among homeowners, a large and growing structural deficit, and
outdated flood maps that do not reflect the growing risks from climate change. The
number of policies in force has declined from a peak of 5.7 million in 2009 to 5
million in 2017. Earned premiums in 2016 and 2017 totaled $3.33 and $3.57
billion, while flood claim payments totaled $3.7 and $8.7 billion (Insurance
Information Institute, 2019). In 2017, the NFIP reached its authorized borrowing
limit of $30.425 billion; the U.S. Congress subsequently cancelled $16 billion
worth of debt to allow the program to pay off claims following Hurricanes Harvey,
Irma, and Maria. As of 2019, the program’s outstanding debt stands at $20.525
billion (Horn, 2019). This legacy of debt has led to renewed attempts to study (and
improve) the program.
2.2.

The Community Rating System

In order to strengthen the NFIP, incentivize household flood insurance takeup, and promote community-level flood hazard mitigation, FEMA created the
Community Rating System (CRS) in 1990. The CRS is a voluntary incentive
program for local governments that “encourages community floodplain
management activities that exceed the minimum NFIP requirements.”
Homeowners’ flood insurance premium rates are discounted according to the
degree of community participation in efforts to meet the three primary goals of the
CRS:
•
•
•

Reduce flood damage to insurable property
Strengthen and support the insurance aspects of the NFIP
Foster comprehensive floodplain management (FEMA, 2017)

Local governments that opt into the CRS program are awarded points based on their
commitment to and adoption of specific floodplain management activities
organized under 4 categories: (1) Public information, (2) Flood mapping and
regulation, (3) Flood damage reduction, and (4) Flood preparedness. The
maximum possible point total is 12,654, and point totals translate into a CRS
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classification, ranging from 10 (the “entry-level” score: less than 500 points) to 1
(the highest score: more than 4500 points).2 Based on this classification,
community flood insurance premium discounts range from 5% to 45% (FEMA,
2017).
2.3.

Investing in Flood Risk Mitigation

The benefits to local governments of participating in the CRS are clear:
community involvement secures immediate flood insurance premium discounts for
property owners. In 2019, Miami Beach, FL improved its CRS rating from Class
6 to Class 5, securing an additional $2 million in annual insurance premium savings
for city residents and businesses. The city’s Class 5 rating provides all
policyholders with a 25% flood insurance discount, which translates into $8.4
million in total annual savings (Miami Beach Rising Above, 2019).
Further, empirical studies have demonstrated that CRS participation
reduces flood damages and increases flood insurance take up. Using data from
1998 to 2014 for all NFIP communities in Alabama and Mississippi, Frimpong et.
al. (2019) find that Class 5 CRS ratings are associated with a 5.8% reduction in the
magnitude of damage claims in the aftermath of a flood event (versus not
participating in the CRS). They find negative – but less significant – effects for
Class 7 and Class 6 communities. Similarly, looking at data from Florida for the
years 2000-2005, Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2010) find a 7% to 9% reduction in
flood claim amounts among Class 5 communities, with negative (but insignificant)
effects for communities with Class 6 through 9 ratings. Brody et. al. (2007),
looking at data from Florida coastal counties from 1997 to 2001, find a much larger
effect from CRS participation, reporting that every increase in CRS rating reduces
average flood damages by $303,525. Given a reported $2.6 million mean flood
event total loss value, a Class 5 community would see a 58% reduction in flood
damages.
Additionally, CRS participation is associated with an increased rate of flood
insurance take up among homeowners. Per Frimpong et al. (2019), CRS
participating communities see significantly higher rates of insurance take up than
non-participating communities, with increasing participation as community CRS
rating improves. According to their model, NFIP participation in Class 5 CRS
communities is 142% higher compared to non-CRS communities and 30% higher
than other CRS-participating communities. Meanwhile, higher rates of NFIP
participation create positive externalities, since federal flood insurance provides

Zahran and Brody (2010) find that communities are “gaming” the non-linear, tiered classification
structure, with a clustering of point totals just above each classification’s point requirement. This
precludes a “regression discontinuity” approach to this thesis.
2
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funds faster and in greater amounts than federal disaster aid alone. This speeds
community rebuilding and recovery in the wake of a disaster (Kousky, 2017).
However, CRS participation is costly. Per Li and Landry (2018), flood
hazard identification, assessment, and management are resource intensive,
requiring skilled personnel and capital investments. Aside from any immediate
insurance premium discounts offered by the CRS, the benefits of investing in
hazard mitigation come only in the aftermath of flood events and are difficult to
quantify. More immediate concerns, such as crime or economic development, may
crowd out concerns relating to the uncertain risks of future flood and disaster
events. Further, flood-prone areas are often prime real estate – effective floodplain
management policies may require restricting development or adding regulations
that make building more costly, thus reducing property tax revenues and attracting
opposition from developers and property owners. The authors find that
communities with more fiscal resources do in fact engage in more flood hazard
mitigation activities, with the effect particularly significant for more costly (and
effective) mitigation activities relating to flood protection and property acquisition.
Conversely, higher rates of crime and unemployment are associated with fewer
mitigation activities, suggesting that a crowding out effect does exist. Brody et al.
(2009) find that the most significant driving factor for CRS participation is the
premium discounts offered by the program – increases in population density and
insured property value lead to higher potential per capita gains from participation,
which in turn incentivizes community flood risk mitigation activities.
In addition to socio-economic factors, flood history and the salience of past
flood events influence community mitigation decisions. Li and Landry (2018) find
that an increase in the number of flood events in the past year drives a small (but
significant) increase in mitigation activities, whereas more distant flood events
have no significant impact. Brody et al. (2009) find that an increase in the
frequency (but not intensity) of flood events over the preceding 10 years induces
modest policy change. Given that community flood mitigation policy decisions are
a function of the political process, these results reflect individual actions in the
wake of disaster events. Specifically, Beracha and Prati (2008) find little long-term
effects on home prices in zip codes impacted by hurricanes, suggesting that disaster
events may lead to transitory changes in risk salience but few long-term effects.
The factors that influence why certain communities engage in flood risk
mitigation are a central focus of the empirical literature, with certain patterns
emerging in predictable ways – wealthier and denser communities with a longer
history of flooding invest more in mitigation, while poorer communities tend to
underinvest in beneficial mitigation activities.
2.4.

Valuing Flood Risk Mitigation
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A less studied area within the literature is the value that individuals and
homeowners place on flood risk, flood risk mitigation, and community CRS
participation. Bin et al. (2008), employing a GIS-based measure of view in order
to isolate risk factors from amenity factors that are often highly correlated (e.g.
flood risk and water views), find a significant 11% discount for properties in flood
hazard zones. Meanwhile, Husby et al. (2018), tying an assumption that spatial
differences in flood risk and flood protection are priced in by housing markets,
construct a residential sorting model to illustrate that lower home prices in riskier
locations will induce lower-income households to migrate to those areas. This
follows the literature on Tiebout-sorting, which suggests that supply and quality of
public goods drives household migration decisions.
Returning to the CRS literature, Fan and Davlasheridze (2016) analyze
households’ flood risk perceptions and willingness to pay (WTP) for community
CRS mitigation activities, finding that wealthier and more educated households
have a higher WTP for CRS activities. Their paper employs a residential sorting
model to examine location choices under changes in flood risk and local mitigation
policies across U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas, finding heterogeneity in risk
perception and WTP based on age, ethnicity and race, educational attainment, and
prior risk exposure. Their results follow the convention that wealthier households
tend to value (and be able to pay for) higher quality public services, and they find
that the value households place on CRS activities exceeds the insurance discounts
on offer through the program, suggesting a preference for community safety and
mitigated flood risks beyond the immediate benefits that come from lower
insurance premiums.
2.5.

Pricing in Climate Change

A related body of literature focuses on the general question of whether
market dynamics and prices are reflecting the growing flood and storm risks posed
by climate change. Keenan et al. (2018) find evidence of “climate gentrification”
in Miami-Dade County, whereby the rates of price appreciation for single-family
homes at lower elevations have not kept pace with the rates of appreciation for
homes at higher elevations. Similarly, looking at coastal home valuations across
the country, Bernstein, Gustafson, and Lewis (2018) find that homes exposed to sea
level rise risk are trading at a 7% discount versus otherwise observably equivalent
properties, with heterogeneity in climate risk capitalization across sophisticated and
less-sophisticated market segments (non-owner occupied vs. owner-occupied
homes). Walsh et al. (2019) examine the impact of both sea level rise and risk
mitigating measures on coastal home values in Anne Arundel County, Maryland.
Employing a hedonic model to examine the price effects of private flood protection
measures, they find that certain structures (bulkheads and ripraps) have a positive
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effect on home prices, with the effects strongest for homes most exposed to sea
level rise risk.
2.6.

Summary

There is a large body of literature on the determinants and benefits of
community flood risk mitigation investments, housing market responses to spatial
differences in flood and sea level rise risk, households’ willingness to pay for
mitigation, and the CRS program. My thesis seeks to build on these studies of the
CRS program by adding two new dimensions – a more recent study period (20092018)3 and an analysis of whether home prices respond to program participation.
Specifically: I examine whether increasing flood risks during this time period have
led to increases in program participation and increases in score among participants;
I look at the socio-economic characteristics of the communities that are
participating and the participating communities that are increasing their scores,
along the lines of Brody et al. (2009) and Li and Landry (2018); and I study the
relationship between CRS program participation and home values and active CRS
scores and home values.
3. Theory
In analyzing local governments’ CRS-credit earning flood risk mitigation
investments and any associated home value changes, I first turn to the seminal study
of Oates (1969), who showed that property values are positively associated with
public goods provision and negatively associated with property tax rates. This
“capitalization effect” demonstrates that consumers value public goods, and this is
manifested in higher home values in communities that provide higher quality public
goods (e.g. low crime and good schools). Brueckner (1982) extends this result to
show that the use of a property values capitalization approach “provides a way for
local governments to set public-good levels in a socially optimal manner”
(Brueckner, 2011). Referencing these two studies, and drawing upon Brueckner
(2011), I first demonstrate the relationship between public good levels and property
values, and then I build a (stylized) bid-rent model for my context of public flood
protection.
3.1.

Capitalization

3

Other studies of CRS program participation examine periods prior to 2013, when CRS program
scoring criteria changed. This presents an empirical challenge; I deal with this change in
Appendix A.
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Consider the rental housing market. Suppose that the utility of a renter
household in any town depends on non-housing consumption C, housing
consumption H, and consumption of a standard public good G (e.g. fire protection).
Consumption of G is determined by location choice – where a household rents
determines which bundle of municipal public goods it consumes. Each household
faces a budget constraint, spending some percentage of income on H (in the form
of rent R) and the remainder on C. Formally, each household maximizes utility
subject to its budget constraint:
𝑚𝑎𝑥 u(C,H,G)
s.t. Y = C + R
In equilibrium, all households with a given income must obtain the same utility
regardless of location choice. That is, if living in Town A supplies a household
with higher G (e.g. faster fire department response times), while living in Town B
supplies a household with lower G (slower response times), households in A must
necessarily pay a higher rent than in B (for an otherwise identical housing unit).
This allows households in Town B to enjoy a higher level of consumption of the
non-housing good, ensuring that the two households achieve the same overall utility
level. Otherwise, households would sort between the two towns, bidding up (or
down) rental prices until utility was equalized. Housing rents are thus a function
of the level of public goods supplied by the local government:
R = R(G)
Housing values, meanwhile, are directly linked to rents: the value of a rental
property is equal to the present discounted value of the lifetime income (rent) that
flows to the owner, minus any operating costs. Continuing in the Brueckner (2011)
framework, a major operating cost for property owners is the annual property tax
T. Allowing δ to be the discount rate, the value V of an individual home is equal to
the present discounted value of the annual rental price it commands minus the
annual property tax liability over N years:
𝑁

𝑉=∑
𝑡=1

𝑅𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡
(1 + δ)𝑡

Property values are thus positively associated with rents (themselves positively
associated with the level of public goods) and negatively associated with taxes.
3.2.

Property Value Maximization
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Now suppose that each town is governed by a town manager, who is
empowered to make tax and spend decisions for the town and who is assumed to
act through a property-value-maximizing lens. The town manager has access to the
jurisdiction’s property value information, as well as the costs of providing each unit
of the public good, which are fully borne by town residents through a property tax.
The manager’s decision problem involves weighing the marginal benefits of each
additional unit of the public good versus the marginal cost – e.g. are the benefits
from an additional firehouse (through faster response times for each household)
greater than the cost? Recalling that home values are linked to rents (themselves a
function of G) and taxes (which pay for G), the decision problem involves
determining whether the increase in annual rents from an additional unit of the
public good exceeds the increase in annual taxes. Formally, assuming just one time
period and a discount rate of 0 for simplicity (N=1, δ=0), each town manager
maximizes aggregate property values (equal to the sum of the values of all K homes
in the town), whereby the sum of all annual taxes equals the annual cost c(G) of
providing the public good:
𝐾

𝐾

𝐾

𝐾

∑ 𝑉𝑘 = ∑ 𝑅𝑘 – ∑ 𝑇𝑘 = ∑ 𝑅𝑘 − 𝑐(𝐺)
𝑘=1

𝑘=1

𝑘=1

𝑘=1

If we assume that the marginal benefits from each additional unit of the public good
are decreasing (the 2nd firehouse will provide fewer benefits than the first), there
will come a point where the marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits of an
additional unit of G: the current level of the public good is “socially optimal.” This
optimal level corresponds to the property-value-maximizing level – an additional
unit of the public good would cause property values to decrease, since the marginal
cost (paid for through higher property taxes) exceeds the marginal benefit.
Meanwhile, the presence of other jurisdictions – and the threat of “voting-withyour-feet” – ensures that town managers have an incentive to achieve this optimal
level of public goods provision. Otherwise, households would sort into another
community that provide a more desirable bundle of home prices, public goods, and
tax levels, and home values in the “non-optimizing” town would decrease.
3.3.

The Optimal Level of Flood Protection

Consider the following example, which illustrates this process of propertyvalue-maximizing in a context of fire and flood risk. Suppose first that a town has
three renter households (K=3, for simplicity) living in identical homes, with each
home commanding an annual rent of $10,000. The town manager has latitude to
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determine both the level of fire protection provision G and the level of flood
protection provision P, with G funded by a tax of T and P by a tax of 𝑇 ′ levied on
each home. The town currently supplies one “unit” of G (a firehouse) at an annual
total cost of $150 divided equally between the three homes (T=$50). In any given
year, there is some probability f of a fire destroying a home, with f a function of a
home’s fire risk and the town’s level of G. Additionally, the town is subject to
coastal flooding, and there is some annual probability q of a flood destroying a
home, with q a function of the town’s flood risk and the town’s level of P. In the
event of a flood or fire, the annual rent that a (now nonexistent) home commands
is 0. In the presence of the firehouse (G=1), f is equal to 0.020. In the absence of
any flood protection (P=0), q is equal to 0.10. The property value of home k is then
equal to the rental income it commands multiplied by the probability that the home
is not destroyed, net of all taxes. Formally, assuming 1 time period and a discount
rate of 0 for simplicity (N=1, δ=0):
𝑉𝑘 = 𝑅𝑘 ∗ (1 – 𝑓 − 𝑞) − (𝑇 + 𝑇 ′ )
Suppose that the local government now invests in one “unit” of flood
protection (e.g. all seawalls are raised by one foot) at a total cost of $450, on top of
the existing provision of G. The higher seawalls reduce the annual probability of a
destructive flood to 0.060, as a flood event would have to be more severe for waters
to crest the new (higher) seawalls. The value of each home goes up by $400 to
reflect the (now lower) probability of destruction. However, the total cost of raising
the seawalls is $450 (assessed through a new tax on each home of 𝑇 ′ =$150), and
this additional annual cost reduces the increase in each home’s value to $250.
Summing up the costs and benefits of this first unit of P, the aggregate property
value of the town’s 3 homes rises to $27,000. Table 1 presents the numbers:
Table 1.
G P f

q

R*
(1–f–q)

T

8,800
9,200
9,450
9,550

50
50
50
50

𝑇′

𝑉𝑘

𝐾=3

∑ 𝑉𝑘

Marginal cost
of this unit of P

𝑘=1

1
1
1
1

0
1
2
3

0.020
0.020
0.020
0.020

0.10
0.060
0.035
0.025

0
150
300
450

8,750
9,000
9,100
9,050

26,250
27,000
27,300
27,150

0
450
450
450

Marginal
benefit of this
unit of P
0
1200
750
300

The table presents a scenario where every additional unit of P carries with it
decreasing marginal benefits, a reasonable assumption given the example of
seawalls (or other flood risk mitigation measures, e.g. more stringent building
codes). As can be seen from the table, property values are maximized when P=2:
the marginal costs of increasing P to 3 outweigh the marginal benefits. P=2 is thus
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the “efficient” level of public flood protection provision for this town. At any point
above P=2, home values would decrease.
Suppose that the above result – that of an “efficient” level of P=2 – holds
for one time period. However, suppose that the probability of flood events is
increasing due to climate change. In Table 2, the probability of flood events has
increased – from 0.10 to 0.15 at baseline, and from 0.025 to 0.030 when P=3 – and
the “efficient” level of P is now P=3:
Table 2.
G P

f

q

R*
(1–f–q)

T

8,300
9,000
9,300
9,500
9,600

50
50
50
50
50

𝑇′

𝑉𝑘

𝐾=3

∑ 𝑉𝑘

Marginal cost
of this unit of P

𝑘=1

1
1
1
1
1

0
1
2
3
4

0.020
0.020
0.020
0.020
0.020

0.15
0.080
0.050
0.030
0.020

0
150
300
450
600

8,250
8,800
8,950
9,000
8,950

24,750
26,400
26,850
27,000
26,850

0
450
450
450
450

Marginal
benefit of this
unit of P
0
2100
900
600
300

This (stylized) model presents three assumptions: given increasing flood
risks due to climate change, the “optimal” level of public flood protection provision
is increasing, and we would expect increases in provision of this public good among
towns. Meanwhile, given the reality of heterogeneity between towns – whether in
flood risk, the marginal costs of flood protection provision (e.g. differences in
population density or shoreline length would present different mitigation costs), or
the marginal benefits of flood protection provision (e.g. a town with more valuable
real estate would have a larger incentive to invest) – we would expect differences
in flood protection provision across towns. Finally, if flood protection provision is
viewed as a public good, we would expect housing markets to respond to its
provision, much in the same way they do to the provision of fire protection or better
public schools.
4. Methodology
These preceding three (testable) assumptions motivate my empirical
questions: (1) are local governments increasing their investment in public flood
protection provision as flood risks increase, as would be expected under their
adjustment to the “social optimum?” Further, every town differs in its
socioeconomic and demographic makeup, financial capacity, and political
priorities, and each may choose to invest in a different level of flood mitigation –
(2) what factors are associated with local governments that do invest in flood
protection? Finally, (3) is there a relationship between flood provision and home
values, and how might this vary by flood risk or residents’ income levels?
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4.1.

Empirical Strategy

To answer these three questions, I build a dataset of 405 municipalities in
the state of Florida,4 combining data from FEMA, the U.S. Census Bureau, the
Florida Department of Revenue, and the Florida Department of Financial Services.
The FEMA data includes a dataset from the Community Rating System (CRS),
which provides a detailed score breakdown for all Florida jurisdictions participating
in the program from 2009-2018.5 I first code each Florida jurisdiction based on
whether it participates in the CRS program in each year: “1” for participating
communities, “0” for non-participating communities. Following Sadiq and
Noonan’s (2015) classification of risk-reducing measures, I next break down
participating community’s CRS point totals into an “active” subtotal, defined as the
sum of score totals for select series 400, 500, and 600 activities.6 These “active”
activities require large capital outlays (flood protection infrastructure), impose
large costs on property owners (stronger regulatory standards), or result in large
foregone tax revenues (open space preservation) and thus are more likely to
influence property values. I employ Active CRS score as my proxy for a local
government’s investment in public flood protection provision. The maximum
possible score total is 10,649 (FEMA, 2017), but the range of scores in my dataset
tops out at just 1,889 points.7 Table 3 summarizes all variables I use in my analysis,
and Table 4 provides summary statistics:
Table 3.
Variable
Name
Participate

Description

Active CRS
Score

The sum of points awarded by FEMA each
year to a local government for “active”
flood plain management activities, which I
define as Class 420 (Open Space

A categorical variable recording whether a
municipality participates (1) or does not
participate (0) in the FEMA CRS program.

Year
s
20092018

20092018

Source
Obtained from FEMA’s Federal
Insurance and Mitigation
Administration (FIMA) on October
18, 2019 following an email request to
Bill Lesser, FIMA’s national CRS
coordinator.
Obtained from FEMA’s Federal
Insurance and Mitigation
Administration (FIMA) on October
18, 2019 following an email request to

4

My dataset includes all Florida cities, towns, and villages, except for those owned by the Walt
Disney Co. (Bay Lake and Lake Buena Vista) and those with populations below 100 (removed
after an outlier analysis).
5
I received this data on October 18, 2019 following an email request to Bill Lesser, the national
CRS coordinator at FEMA’s Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration.
6
My dataset includes towns that switched between FEMA scoring regimes after 2013; my
approach for dealing with this change is in Appendix A.
7
In most of these “active” CRS subcategories, the maximum possible score is significantly higher
than the maximum actual score achieved by any community in the United States.
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Bill Lesser, FIMA’s national CRS
coordinator.

Preservation), 430 (Higher Regulatory
Standards), 450 (Stormwater
Management), 510 (Floodplain
Management Planning), 520 (Acquisition
and Relocation), 530 (Flood Protection),
540 (Drainage System Maintenance), 610
(Flood Warning and Response), 620
(Levees), and 630 (Dams) activities.
The proportion of a municipality’s land
area that is in a FEMA-designated “High
Risk” flood area. FEMA periodically
updates flood maps (roughly every 10
years for my study area).
The number of flood insurance claims
processed by the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) within a municipality’s
present-day boundaries from 1980-1990
divided by the municipality’s population in
2009.
The number of flood insurance claims
processed by the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) within a municipality’s
present-day boundaries within the
preceding 3 years divided by the
municipality’s population in 2009.
The municipally set tax rate used to
calculate local property taxes. The rate
represents the amount of tax due each year
per every $1,000 of assessed property
value.

As of
Jan.,
2020

Taxable
Property
Value per
cap

The total taxable property value in a
municipality (after accounting for all
property exemptions) divided by the
municipality’s population in 2009.

20082018

Debt per
cap

The sum of long-term debt of a
municipality government divided by the
municipality’s population in 2009.

20092018

Police
Spend per
cap

A local government’s spending on law
enforcement each year from 2009-2018
divided by its 2009 population.

20092018

Road
Spend per
cap

A local government’s spending on roads
and streets each year from 2009-2018
divided by its 2009 population.

20092018

Flood
Zone
Percentage

1980-90
Flood
Claims per
cap

Recent
Flood
Claims per
cap

Millage
Rate
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19801990

Flood map overlays downloaded from
the FEMA Flood Map Service Center
at: msc.fema.gov/portal/home;
ArcGIS used to calculate the flood
zone percentage
Accessed through the OpenFEMA
“FIMA NFIP Redacted Claims
Dataset”, available online at:
www.fema.gov/medialibrary/assets/documents/180374

20072017

Accessed through the OpenFEMA
“FIMA NFIP Redacted Claims
Dataset”, available online at:
www.fema.gov/medialibrary/assets/documents/180374

20092018

Accessed through the Florida
Department of Revenue’s annual
“Municipal Report”, published online
at: floridarevenue.com/
property/Pages/DataPortal_DataBook.
aspx
Accessed through the Florida
Department of Revenue’s annual
“Municipal Report”, published online
at: floridarevenue.com/
property/Pages/DataPortal_DataBook.
aspx
Accessed through the Florida
Department of Financial Service’s
annual “Total Revenues, Expenditures
and Debt” report, published online at:
apps.fldfs.com/LocalGov/Reports/
Accessed through the Florida
Department of Financial Service’s
annual “Expenditure Details” report,
published online at:
apps.fldfs.com/LocalGov/Reports/
Accessed through the Florida
Department of Financial Service’s
annual “Expenditure Details” report,
published online at:
apps.fldfs.com/LocalGov/Reports/
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Park
Spend per
cap

A local government’s spending on
libraries, parks, and special events each
year from 2009-2018 divided by its 2009
population.

20092018

Zillow
Singlefamily
Home
Value
Index

The Zillow Single-family Home Value
Index each year from 2010-2019 for a
municipality. The Zillow Single-family
Home Value Index is a measure of a
typical home’s value as determined by
overall local market conditions.

20082019

2009
Population

The population of a municipality (“place”),
as compiled by the American Community
Survey’s 2009 5-year estimates.

2009

2009
Population
Density

The population of a municipality (“place”),
as compiled by the American Community
Survey’s 2009 5-year estimates, divided by
its land area in square kilometers.

2009

2009
Median
Household
Income

The median household income in 2009
inflation-adjusted dollars of a municipality
(“place”), as compiled by the American
Community Survey’s 2009 5-year
estimates.
The number of housing units in a
municipality (“place”) where the owner or
co-owner lives in the unit, even if it is
mortgaged or not fully paid for, divided by
its 2009 population.
A summary measure of income inequality
at the municipal (“place”) level. The index
ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to 1
(perfect inequality).

2009

2009
Owner
Occupied
Homes per
cap
2009 Gini
Index

Accessed through the Florida
Department of Financial Service’s
annual “Expenditure Details” report,
published online at:
apps.fldfs.com/LocalGov/Reports/
Accessed through Zillow Research’s
Housing Data portal, available online
at: www.zillow.com/research/data/

Accessed through Social Explorer’s
American Community Survey tables,
available at: www.socialexplorer.com/
tables/ACS2009_5yr. ArcGIS used to
calculate land area.
Accessed through Social Explorer’s
American Community Survey tables,
available at: www.socialexplorer.com/
tables/ACS2009_5yr. ArcGIS used to
calculate land area.
Accessed through Social Explorer’s
American Community Survey tables,
available at: www.socialexplorer.com/
tables/ACS2009_5yr

2009

Accessed through Social Explorer’s
American Community Survey tables,
available at: www.socialexplorer.com/
tables/ACS2009_5yr

2009

Accessed through Social Explorer’s
American Community Survey tables,
available at: www.socialexplorer.com/
tables/ACS2009_5yr

Table 4.
Variable Name

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

Participate 2009
Participate 2018
Active CRS Score
2009-2018 Change in Active CRS
Score
Flood Zone Percentage
1980-90 Flood Claims per cap (#)
Recent Flood Claims per cap (#)
Millage Rate ($/$1000)
Taxable Property Value per cap
($)
Debt per cap ($)

0.421
0.469
1025.825
164.111

0.494
0.499
283.644
219.097

0
0
231
-748.693

1
1
1889
914.904

# of
Observatio
ns
404
405
1742
190

0.343
0.00861
0.00256
4.826
143346.5

0.284
0.0323
0.0180
2.218
316090.4

0
0
0
0.00148
5079.517

1
0.380
0.669
10
5117655

403
405
405
3726
3737

2122.007

7006.848

0

116957.9

4005
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Police Spend per cap ($)
Road Spend per cap ($)
Park Spend per cap ($)
ZHVI ($)
2009 Population
2009 Pop Density (persons per
km^2)
2009 Median Income
2009 Owner Occupied Homes per
cap
2009 Gini Index
# of Panel Observations

388.217
153.572
127.108
269561.8
22990.32
933.896

406.310
218.890
167.3214
421669
57531.76
1072.69

0.00302
0.728
0
28678.33
121
8.155

4172.149
4384.267
1992.315
5263528
802843
8338.15

3443
3748
3457
3953
404
403

57205.13
0.284

28045.8
0.0860

21998
0.0776

265442
0.605

404
404

0.446
2750

0.0657

0.255

0.636

404

4.1.1. Participation and CRS scores over time
Beginning with question (1): an overview of my set of Florida
municipalities indicates two observations – municipalities enter (and exit) the CRS
program, and participating municipalities increase (or decrease) their active score
totals over the study period. To see the degree to which program participation is
increasing each year (as would be expected, if local governments are in fact
responding to the growing risks from flooding due to climate change), I first run
Regression 1A:
̂𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒) = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
(1A) Pr(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒

This linear probability model estimates the correlation between participation (equal
to 1 in each year for CRS participating communities in that year and 0 otherwise)
and time (from 2009 to 2018) for town i in year t. The town-level fixed effect is
denoted by ui. I elect to use a linear probability model for ease of interpretation, but
I run a logistic regression (not shown) as a robustness check and find similar results.
For this and all following panel regressions, I use robust standard errors and cluster
at the town level.
Next, focusing on the municipalities that are participating in the program, I
analyze whether these local governments are investing more in active CRS
measures (e.g. flood protection measures) over the study period (2009-2018) by
estimating the correlation between time and active CRS score for town i in year t in
Regression 1B:
(1B) 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡

I run specifications with and without city-level fixed effects for both regressions to
determine how much variation can be explained by non-time varying town
characteristics.
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4.1.2. Determinants of CRS participation
Turning to question (2), I examine three different measures of government
provision of flood protection: CRS program participation at the end of the study
period (2018), average active CRS score from 2009-2018, and change in active
CRS score from 2009-2018.
̂
(2A) Pr(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑖,𝑡=2018 = 1|𝑋) = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 +
𝑏2 𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏3 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡=2009 +𝑏4 ∑1990
𝑡=1980 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑖 + 𝑏5 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖 +
𝑏6 𝑃𝑜𝑝_𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏7 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏8 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟_𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡=2009 +
𝑏9 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏10 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡=2009

I first run Regression 2A (a linear probability model) to examine the extent to
which each of the following factors influence a municipality’s participation in the
CRS program at the end of my study period (2018): baseline financial capacity,
historic flood history, flood risk, and a series of baseline demographic and socioeconomic town characteristics. I employ 2009 millage rate, 2009 taxable property
value per capita,8 and 2009 debt per capita as measures of baseline financial
capacity, hypothesizing that lower millage rates, higher property values, and lower
debt levels would promote flood protection investment. In the case of millage rates,
a lower rate could provide a government with greater flexibility to raise rates in
order to afford flood protection investments. I then include per capita number of
flood claims from 1980 to 19909 as a measure of historic flood history and flood
zone percentage as a proxy for flood risk, predicting that a higher number of historic
flood claims and a greater percentage of land area in a flood zone would lead to
greater investment. Finally, I include 2009 population density as a city built
environment control in order to test for whether density affects investment (I predict
that more people and property at risk from flooding – and thus higher expected
flood losses – would incentivize investment), 2009 median income as a test for
whether flood protection is a normal good, 2009 owner occupied homes per capita
as a proxy for resident engagement (I hypothesize that owner-occupants would be
more engaged in matters pertaining to long-term investment decisions), 2009 Gini
Index as a test for whether population heterogeneity affects investment, and 2009
population as an additional control (but with an uncertain impact – larger cities
would likely have more resources to engage in flood risk mitigation, but these cities

8

Taxable value includes residential and commercial properties.
The FEMA CRS program was established in 1990. Floods prior to 1990 would have occurred in
the absence of CRS-incentivized flood risk mitigation measures – this variable could thus be a
candidate for an exogenous predictor of program participation and investment.
9
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may also have more competing priorities). I run specifications with and without
different variables due to concerns about collinearity.10
I next focus on participating communities and the factors that influence their
degree of participation in the program:
(2B) ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑖,2009−2018 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡=200 +
𝑏2 𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏3 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡=2009 +𝑏4 ∑1990
𝑡=1980 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑖 + 𝑏5 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖 +
𝑏6 𝑃𝑜𝑝_𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏7 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏8 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟_𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡=2009 +
𝑏9 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏10 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

In cross-section Regression 2B, I examine the Average Active CRS Score from
2009-2018 for town i as a function of the baseline indicators used in Regression
2A. This specification aims to explain who were “high-performing” cities during
the study period, whether they began the study period with already-high CRS scores
or increased scores during the period.
Finally, Regression 2C examines the 2009-2018 change in active CRS
score for town i as a function of baseline characteristics:
(2C) ∆𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡=2009−2018 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 +
𝑏2 𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏3 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏4 ∑1990
𝑡=1980 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑖 + 𝑏5 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖 +
𝑏6 𝑃𝑜𝑝_𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏7 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏8 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟_𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡=2009 +
𝑏9 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝑏10 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

I use the same independent variables as in Regression 2A and 2B, with the objective
of determining what 2009 town characteristics predict score changes over the next
10-year period. This specification differs from 2B in that it focuses on towns with
large changes in the score over the study period; “high performing” towns that
entered the period with high scores and maintained those scores would have a
recorded change of “0”. The differences between both specifications determine
whether the characteristics of towns making CRS investments from 2009-2018
differ from those of towns that made investments prior to 2009.
4.1.3. Home values and investment in flood mitigation
Turning to question (3), I analyze the relationship between median home
value (as measured by the community’s Zillow single-family Home Value Index11)
and local government investment in flood protection.
10

Correlated variables (>0.40) include median income and tax value (0.51), debt and tax value
(.67), owner occupied homes and tax value (0.41), Gini index and tax value (0.44), owner
occupied homes and median income (0.43), and flood zone % and 1980-90 flood claims (0.45).
11
I focus solely on single-family homes in order to allow for a more precise comparison between
home values across municipalities.
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I first examine program participation in each year from 2009 to 2018 and
home values in the following year in panel Regression 3A:
(3A) 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽5 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 ∑𝑡−1
𝑡−4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

I incorporate an interaction term between participate and flood zone percentage in
order to determine the additional effects of program participation in high flood zone
percentage cities, as well as an interaction term with 2009 median income to
determine whether there is a differential effect on home values among different
income CRS participating cities. I include a series of one-year lagged variables
controlling for changing tax levels and provision of other local public goods:
millage rate, police spending per capita, road spending per capita, and park
spending per capita. In the state of Florida, schools are the purview of county
governments, so these “other public goods” variables likely capture the most
perceptible differences between municipalities. I predict that increases in park
spending would be correlated with rising home values, while a rise in police
spending could have opposing effects (either resulting in higher values due to
increases in public safety, or lower values if higher spending is a response to rising
crime). Higher road spending could likewise either raise home values (better
infrastructure; less potholes) or lower home values (if spending is a response to
higher traffic levels). Finally, I include a recent flood claims variable to control for
any “shocks” to the housing market in the form of major hurricanes or other flood
events. I further include city and time-fixed effects, in order to control for non-time
varying city characteristics (baseline flood risk; natural amenities; distance to
employment centers) and to control for fluctuations in home prices in each year.
In Regression 3B, I next turn to CRS participating cities, and I use the same
specification as in 3A but with active CRS score in town i in year t as my
independent variable of interest:
(3B) 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2009 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽5 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 ∑𝑡−1
𝑡−4 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡

5. Results
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Figure 1.

Figure 2.

Table 5: (1A) CRS Participation 2009-2018
Dependent variable:
Time
Constant

City Fes
Observations
R-squared
Number of Cities

CRS Participation
(1)
(2)

Active CRS Scores
(3)
(4)

0.00507***
[0.002]
0.403***
[0.026]

0.00514***
[0.002]
0.403***
[0.010]

20.57***
[2.403]
910.6***
[24.733]

23.01***
[2.259]
896.9***
[12.656]

No
4,038
0.001
405

Yes
4,038
0.930
405

No
1,742
0.044
199

Yes
1,742
0.837
199

Notes: Observations in columns 1-2 are city-years for all cities (405), with participation = 1 for
participating cities, 0 otherwise. Observations in columns 3-4 are city-years for all municipalities
participating in the CRS program (199). Robust standard errors clustered by city in brackets:
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Turning first to question (1): is the level of public flood protection
increasing, as measured by local governments’ provision of this public good?
Looking first at CRS program participation, the results in columns 1 and 2 suggest
that time is statistically significant relative to program participation.12 This
confirms what is shown in Figure 1, whereby the number of cities participating
increased after 2015. In 2009, 170 cities (out of 404) were participating; in 2018,
190 (out of 40513) were. Meanwhile, columns 3 and 4 analyze active CRS scores,
and the results in column 4 indicate that there is a steady increase in score with each
passing year, averaging 23 points (2.24% of the average annual score) within cities.
The high R-squared value in the column 4 specification with fixed effects suggests
that underlying town characteristics explain most of the variation in score changes.
12

The magnitude and significance of the coefficient on Time are robust to a logistic specification
(not shown).
13
Estero, FL was incorporated in 2014; Westlake, FL was incorporated in 2016; Islandia, FL was
unincorporated in 2012.
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There is a slight decrease in average annual score after 2015 (Figure 2), perhaps
coinciding with the growth in program participation (newly participating cities
would likely enter the program with lower scores).
Table 6: (2A) Predicting CRS Program Participation in 2018
Dependent Variable:
(1)
2009 Millage Rate
($/$1,000)
2009 Taxable Value per
capita ($100,000s)
2009 Debt per capita
($1,000s)
1980-90 Flood Claims
per capita (#)
Flood Zone (% in
decimal)
2009 Population Density
(100s)
2009 Median Income
($10,000s)
2009 Owner Occupied
Homes per capita (#)
2009 Gini Index (1-0)
2009 Population
(10,000s)
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(2)

-0.0195
[0.012]
0.0159***
[0.005]

CRS Participation
(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.0156
[0.013]
-0.00912
[0.015]
0.00354
[0.005]
0.882*
[0.510]
0.237**
[0.109]
0.0133***
[0.004]
0.0273*
[0.015]
0.253
[0.359]
0.476
[0.421]

0.316***
[0.071]

-0.0988
[0.172]

0.159
[0.126]

-0.103
[0.229]

-0.0230**
[0.011]
0.000282
[0.012]
0.000669
[0.004]
1.081**
[0.474]
0.270***
[0.100]
0.00876***
[0.003]
0.0223*
[0.013]
0.639**
[0.321]
0.140
[0.369]
0.0460***
[0.010]
-0.0806
[0.201]

372
0.184

372
0.201

372
0.187

372
0.207

372
0.348

0.928*
[0.492]
0.256**
[0.101]
0.0140***
[0.004]

-0.0176
[0.013]

0.00120
[0.002]
1.104**
[0.517]
0.246**
[0.108]
0.0128***
[0.004]
0.0286**
[0.013]

0.00322
[0.002]
0.724
[0.467]
0.275***
[0.100]
0.0139***
[0.004]

0.565*
[0.341]
0.438
[0.404]

Notes: Observations are cities with available data (372). Regressions predict CRS participation in
2018 (Participate = 1, 0 otherwise). Robust standard errors clustered by city in
brackets:***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Moving to question (2): What factors predict local government investment
in flood risk protection? Table 6 presents the results for CRS program
participation in 2018.14 Column 1 includes financial capacity and flood risk
variables, apart from debt. Columns 2, 3, and 4 further incorporate socio-economic
and demographic controls. Column 2 includes median income and Gini index but
excludes millage rate and tax value. Column 3 includes owner-occupied homes but
excludes taxable value, median income, and Gini index. Column 4 includes all
variables, and column 5 includes population as an additional control.
Flood zone %, population density, and median income are significant
positive predictors across all specifications, with a one standard deviation (SD)
14

The relative magnitude and significance of the coefficients are robust to a logistic specification
(not shown).
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increase in flood zone % (0.28), population density (1,073), and median income
(28,046) increasing the probability of participation by 6.6-7.7%, 9.4-15.0%, and
6.3-8.0%, respectively. Flood claims per capita is consistently significant and
positive in all specifications except column 3, with a one SD increase (0.032)
associated with a 2.8-3.5% increased probability. Population is also a positive
predictor, with a one SD (57,000) increase associated with a 26.2% higher
probability. Taxable value per capita has a significant and positive coefficient in
column 1, but this significance disappears with additional controls (and
interpretation is made difficult due to high correlations with debt, median income,
and Gini index). Owner occupied homes per capita is significant and positive in
columns 3 and 5, but this significance disappears in the absence of a population
control in column 4. Millage rate is likewise significant (but negative) when
controlling for population.
Overall, it appears that towns with higher flood zone percentages, more
historic flood claims, higher population densities, higher median incomes, and
larger populations tend to participate in the CRS program. Less certain but positive
predictors of participation include the number of owner-occupied homes and
taxable value, while higher millage rates are a negative predictor. These results
suggest that the cities that are participating are those with higher expected flood
losses (more land area in flood zones and greater densities of people and property),
wealthier residents (program participation appears to be a “normal good”), and
more owner-occupiers (and residents who may be more engaged with long-term
issues).
Table 7 presents results for average active CRS score. Column 1 includes
financial capacity and flood risk variables, except for debt. Column 2 includes debt
and a population control but excludes tax value. Columns 3-5 incorporate socioeconomic and demographic controls. Column 3 includes median income and Gini
index but excludes millage rate and tax value. Column 4 includes all variables,
while column 5 again incorporates population.
Population density and median income have significant negative
coefficients across specifications, with a one SD increase in each (1,072 additional
residents; a $28,045 increase in income) associated with a 53.1-73.7-point decrease
(5.2-7.2% of the average score of 1,026) and 50.2-60.0-point (4.9-5.8%) decrease
in score, respectively. Meanwhile, greater inequality (a higher Gini index) has a
positive association with score, with a 1 SD (0.0657) increase associated with a
44.2-60.0-point increase in score. Columns 2 and 5 suggest that population is
positive and significant, with every additional 57,000 residents associated with an
additional 73.3-75.6 points. Flood zone % has a significant and positive coefficient
in all specifications but column 4, with a 0.28 increase predicting a 36.7-45.3-point
increase in score. Millage is a consistent negative predictor of average scores, with
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the significant coefficients in columns 2 and 5 suggesting a 50-point decrease with
every 2.22 mill increase in property tax rates. Debt is significant and negative in
the absence of tax value (columns 2 and 3), while taxable value is significant and
negative in 1 and 4. The high correlation between both variables (0.67) makes
interpretation of their coefficients difficult, but the results suggest that higher
taxable values, even when controlling for debt, are associated with lower scores,
while the association between debt and score is less clear.
Table 7: (2B) Predicting Average Active CRS Score from 2009-2018
Dependent Variable:
(1)
2009 Millage Rate
($/$1,000)
2009 Taxable Value per
capita ($100,000s)
2009 Debt per capita
($1,000s)
1980-90 Flood Claims
per capita (#)
Flood Zone (% in
decimal)
2009 Population Density
(100s)
2009 Median Income
($10,000s)
2009 Owner Occupied
Homes per capita (#)
2009 Gini Index (1-0)
2009 Population
(10,000s)
Constant

-16.74
[12.048]
-8.466**
[3.759]

Average Active CRS Score
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

816.6***
[310.676]

-17.36
[11.928]
-19.31*
[10.714]
3.437
[3.635]
-252.0
[394.742]
124.5
[86.405]
-6.055***
[1.733]
-16.63*
[9.091]
281.5
[322.995]
913.0***
[327.426]

1,091***
[68.513]

13.26***
[3.157]
1,061***
[66.894]

778.9***
[137.130]

736.3***
[191.162]

-22.08**
[11.140]
-14.90
[10.904]
1.817
[3.652]
-239.8
[391.206]
147.1*
[83.907]
-6.867***
[1.728]
-16.28*
[8.877]
541.7
[330.974]
672.3**
[323.197]
12.83***
[3.360]
733.0***
[185.406]

189
0.083

189
0.146

189
0.111

189
0.139

189
0.198

-141.5
[399.220]
150.0*
[79.820]
-4.955***
[1.808]

Observations
R-squared

-22.75**
[11.200]

-2.326***
[0.884]
-41.51
[391.205]
161.7**
[76.550]
-5.996***
[1.794]

-2.628**
[1.018]
-68.00
[383.894]
130.9*
[74.312]
-6.674***
[1.663]
-17.91**
[8.061]

Notes: Observations are cities participating in the CRS program and with available data (189).
Regressions predict Average Active CRS score from 2009-2018. Robust standard errors clustered
by city in brackets: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Overall, it appears that towns with larger populations, greater inequality (as
measured by a higher Gini index), lower population densities, and lower median
incomes have higher average scores, with lower taxable values, lower millage rates,
and higher flood zone percentages additional (but less certain) predictors of higher
scores. These results suggest that the driving forces behind higher active CRS
scores are different than those behind program participation: while population
density, income, and taxable value are positive predictors of participation, these
variables have negative associations with score. Additionally, historic flood claims
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have a positive (and significant) association with participation but are insignificant
with regards to score. Conversely, inequality (as measured by the Gini index) is
not significant for participation but is significant with regards to score.
Table 8: (2C) Predicting Change in Active CRS Score 2009-2018
Dependent Variable:
(1)
2009 Millage Rate
($/$1,000)
2009 Taxable Value per
capita ($100,000s)
2009 Debt per capita
($1,000s)
1980-90 Flood Claims per
capita (#)
Flood Zone (% in
decimal)
2009 Population Density
(100s)
2009 Median Income
($10,000s)
2009 Owner Occupied
Homes per capita (#)
2009 Gini Index (1-0)

-3.072
[9.549]
-1.379
[6.769]
1.731
[2.552]
225.8
[318.683]
-113.5*
[61.086]
-0.928
[1.486]

(2)

Change in Active CRS Score
(3)
(4)
(5)
-5.127
[9.446]

1.271*
[0.700]
240.7
[319.919]
-110.7**
[54.947]
-1.037
[1.466]
-0.150
[7.085]

1.932***
[0.594]
221.7
[311.553]
-98.74*
[59.455]
-0.528
[1.516]

-376.7
[237.433]

-4.314
[9.702]
4.228
[8.713]
0.604
[2.797]
219.6
[313.746]
-107.9*
[63.807]
-0.484
[1.511]
-1.260
[9.432]
34.29
[232.729]
-441.5*
[262.375]

2009 Population
(10,000s)
2009 Active CRS Score
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(6)

-5.143
[9.879]
5.004
[8.635]
0.320
[2.779]
221.7
[314.160]
-104.0
[64.302]
-0.627
[1.549]
-1.198
[9.399]
79.97
[246.489]
-483.8*
[268.228]
2.253
[2.395]

228.5***
[57.423]

214.8***
[54.472]

396.5***
[121.372]

419.1***
[147.392]

418.5***
[147.806]

-0.396***
[0.065]
669.5***
[144.994]

189
0.027

189
0.027

189
0.037

189
0.039

189
0.041

163
0.257

Notes: Observations in columns 1-5 are cities participating in the CRS program and with available
data (189). Column 6 is cities participating in the CRS program in 2009 (163). Regressions predict
2009-2018 change in active CRS points. Robust standard errors clustered by city in brackets:
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table 8 presents results for change in active CRS score from 2009-2018.
Column 1 includes all financial capacity and flood risk variables. Columns 2-5
incorporate socio-economic and demographic controls. Column 2 includes median
income but excludes tax value and millage rate. Column 3 includes median income
but excludes tax value and median income. Column 4 includes all variables, and
column 5 adds population as a control. Finally, column 6 examines the association
between 2009 active CRS score and change in score.
In comparison to Table 7, the signs on millage rate, population density,
owner occupied homes, and population are the same, although none of the variables
are significant. Meanwhile, the signs on flood claims, flood zone %, Gini index,
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tax value in columns 4-5 and debt in columns 2-3 are opposite between both tables,
with flood zone, Gini index, and debt having significant signs in select
specifications. A one SD increase in flood zone, Gini index, and debt per capita
(0.28, .0657, and $7,007) is associated with a 27.6-31.8-point decrease in score
(16.8-19.4% of the average change of 164.1 points), 29.0-31.8-point decrease, and
8.9-13.5-point increase (5.4-8.2%) across significant specifications, respectively.
Overall, it appears that the towns making the largest improvements in their
scores during this time period are different from those that have the highest average
scores. 2009 CRS score has a negative 0.40 association with change in score,
suggesting that participating cities with high scores in 2009 increased their scores
by less when compared to 2009 participating cities with low scores and/or cities
that entered the program during the study period. Higher flood zone percentage
and more unequal cities appear to have been the “first movers” when it comes to
active CRS score, while the “more recent movers” are at lower flood risk (when
proxied by flood zone percentage), more equal, and appear to have higher debt
loads (perhaps directly related to their flood prevention investments).
Turning to Question (3): is there a relationship between flood provision and
home values, and does this vary by flood risk or income? Table 9 examines CRS
program participation and the effects on median home values. Column 1 examines
whether there is a relationship between participation and home value according to
the panel specification; column 2 adds an interaction term with flood zone; column
3 adds taxation and public goods provision controls; columns 4 and 5 add
interaction terms, first with flood zone and then with median income; column 6
repeats the column 3 specification but with recent flood claims per capita as an
additional control.
Focusing first on columns 1 and 3, the results suggest that there is a positive
but not statistically significant association between program participation and
median home values. The point estimate indicates that participation is associated
with a $6,079 increase in home values (2.3% of the mean value of $269,562) in
column 1. This drops to a $3,579 increase (1.3% of the mean) when controlling for
tax levels and public goods, with the 95% confidence interval extending from $16,718 to $23,876. The magnitude rises to $5,675 when controlling for recent
flood claims in column 6. The interaction terms in columns 2 and 4 provide mixed
evidence for whether there is a differential effect on home values in towns with
large flood zones: participation in a city with 63% of its land area in a flood zone
(one SD above the average 34%) is associated with an insignificant $13,847
increase in home values (3.3% of the mean value of $416,690, when using the
predicted home value based on a regression of ZHVI on flood zone %) in column 2,
but the magnitude drops to $3,209 (0.7% of the mean) in column 4 in the presence
of control variables. Interacting with median income in column 5, the results do
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provide evidence for a differential effect on home values in high income locales:
the interaction term is significantly different from zero. The magnitudes suggest
that participation for a city with a median income of $85,250 (1 SD above the mean)
is associated with an insignificant $21,738 increase (4.1% of the mean value of
$528,053, when using the predicted home value based on a regression of ZHVI on
median income), with the confidence interval extending from -$5,195 to $48,671.
However, for a city with a median income at the 25th percentile ($38,980), the
magnitude drops to -$16,807 (-16.2% of the mean home value of $103,649).
Meanwhile, millage rate and park spending are both significant across
specifications, with results suggesting that housing markets do value park spending
(though this correlation does not extend to police or road spending) and that higher
taxes are capitalized in the form of lower home values.
Table 9: (3A) Homes Values and CRS Participation 2009-2018
Dependent Variable:
(1)

(2)

Median Home Value
(3)
(4)

CRS Participation (t-1)

6,079
-4,239
3,579
[10,184.49] [14,232.32] [10,314.72]
City Millage Rate (t-1)
-16,094**
($/$1,000)
[7,654.752]
Police spending per capita
375.3
(t-1) ($10s)
[1,686.712]
Road spending per capita
523.3
(t-1) ($10s)
[431.399]
Park spending per capita
1,739*
(t-1) ($10s)
[948.717]
CRS Participation (t-1) x
28,709
Flood Zone (% in
[37,283.10]
decimal)
CRS Participation (t-1) x
2009 Median Income
($10,000s)
Recent Flood Claims per
capita (#)
Constant
209,445*** 208,946*** 241,066***
[6,949.431] [7,063.580] [83,518.84]
City & Year Fes
Observations
R-squared

Yes
2,773
0.957

Yes
2,773
0.957

Yes
2,773
0.959

(5)

(6)

4,070
-49,280**
5,675
[13,187.48] [23,426.29] [10,667.67]
-16,099** -16,094** -16,628**
[7,667.230] [7,651.596] [8,270.012]
375.4
353.7
-72.22
[1,687.996] [1,689.669] [1,838.419]
523.2
522.0
403.0
[430.985]
[431.923]
[417.906]
1,739*
1,735*
1,708*
[952.379]
[949.949]
[945.356]
-1,366
[40,758.75]
8,330**
[3,740.937]
-78,710
[68,689.95]
241,107*** 242,456*** 259,039***
[83,343.85] [83,735.28] [90,642.46]
Yes
2,773
0.959

Yes
2,773
0.959

Yes
2,498
0.959

Notes: Observations are city-years for cities with available data (305), with one less year of data
for column 6. Regressions predict the impact of 1-year lagged CRS program participation
(Participate = 1, 0 otherwise) on the Zillow home value index from 2010-2019. Robust standard
errors clustered by city in brackets:
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Overall, the results suggest that there is no statistically significant effect
from CRS participation on home values. However, based on relative magnitudes
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and confidence intervals, there is evidence that participation has higher magnitude
and higher percentage effects on home values in towns with higher median
incomes.
Table 10: (3B) Home Prices and Active CRS Score 2009-2018
Dependent Variable:
Active CRS Score (t-1)
(100s)
City Millage Rate (t-1)
(mills)
Police spending per
capita (t-1) ($10s)
Road spending per
capita (t-1) ($10s)
Park spending per
capita (t-1) ($10s)
Active CRS Score (t-1)
(100s) x Flood Zone %
(dec)
Active CRS Score (t-1)
(100s) x 2009 Median
Income ($10,000s)
Recent Flood Claims
per capita (#)
Constant

City & Year Fes
Observations
R-squared

(1)

(2)

-6,754**
[2,786.03]

-17,082***
[6,020.46]

Median Home Value
(3)
(4)
-6,250**
[2,577.885]
-44,452**
[18,230.65]
-3,035
[2,767.037]
422.9
[530.851]
2,212
[1,576.564]

30,471**
[11,751.1]

-15,645***
[5,809.670]
-42,953**
[17,490.96]
-2,967
[2,781.782]
328.1
[522.812]
2,273
[1,566.146]
27,588**
[13,071.66]

(5)

(6)

-29,667*
[15,979.31]
-43,167**
[17,678.04]
-3,006
[2,771.663]
415.6
[529.636]
2,145
[1,530.411]

-6,948**
[2,747.685]
-44,463**
[18,004.09]
-3,578
[2,851.469]
163.2
[633.175]
2,514
[1,811.750]

3,853
[2,392.099]

331,711*** 311,228***
[16,867.4] [20,992.2]
Yes
1,362
0.958

Yes
1,362
0.959

602,240***
[160,357.5]

575,288***
[163,033.5]

589,736***
[161,342.9]

-69,796
[43,332.24]
629,661***
[163,970.2]

Yes
1,362
0.962

Yes
1,362
0.962

Yes
1,362
0.962

Yes
1,210
0.962

Notes: Observations are city-years for cities participating in the CRS program and with available
data (167), with one less year of data for column 6. Regressions predict the impact of 1-year
lagged Active CRS scores on the Zillow Home Value Index from 2010-2019. Robust standard
errors clustered by city in brackets:
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table 10 presents results for active CRS scores for all program participating
cities, with columns following the same pattern as in Table 9.
Beginning with column 3, the results suggest that on average, across towns,
increases in active CRS score have a significant but negative effect on home values
in the following year. Controlling for taxes and public goods, every 100-point
increase (a roughly 10% improvement on the mean score of 1,026) is associated
with a $6,250 decrease in home values (-2.3% of the mean of $269,562), with the
95% confidence interval extending from -$11,340 to -$1,160. The magnitude is
slightly larger when also controlling for recent flood claims in column 6. The
results for the interaction term in column 4 provide evidence for a differential effect
on home values in towns with large flood zones, with a positive and statistically
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significant interaction between active score and flood zone %. Evaluated at realistic
values, however, the estimated change in home prices is not statistically significant:
a 100-point increase in a city with 63% of its land in a flood zone is associated with
a $1,735 increase in home values (2.3% of the mean value of $416,690), with the
confidence interval extending from -$6,890 to $10,360. Interacting with median
income in column 5, the results provide suggestive evidence for a differential effect
on home values in high income cities, but the results are again not significant: a
100-point increase in a city with a median income of $85,250 is associated with a
$3,178 increase in home values (0.6% of the mean value of $528,053), with the
confidence interval extending from -$7,679 to $14,036. This association drops to
a $14,649 decrease in home values (-14.1% of the mean value of $103,649) for a
city with a $38,980 median income, with the confidence interval ranging from $28,499 to -$799. Meanwhile, millage rate again has a significant and negative
association with home values.15
Overall, it appears that active CRS score levels have a significant and
negative association with home values in the average Florida municipality, but CRS
scores in cities with more land area in flood zones and/or higher median incomes
appear to have a less negative (or positive) effect on home values.
6. Discussion
Through the lens of the FEMA Community Rating System program, local
governments in the state are responding to rising flood risks. From 2009-2018,
there has been an 11.8% increase in CRS program participation among
municipalities and a 19.8% increase in average “active” scores among CRS
participating municipalities. This increase in active scores suggests that
communities are investing more in stormwater systems and flood protection
infrastructure, setting stricter building codes, acquiring and demolishing at-risk
properties, and preserving open spaces.
The cities that are participating in the program are those most at risk (when
flood risk is proxied by the percentage of a city’s land area in a FEMA-designated
high risk flood zone and the number of historic flood claims) and those with higher
population densities, higher incomes, and more owner-occupiers, with some
evidence for a positive association with taxable property values. These results align
with Brody et al. (2009), whose study of local jurisdictions in Florida from 19992005 found that the primary driving force of CRS participation was the flood
insurance premium discounts on offer by the program for communities – higher
15

Millage rate has a significant and negative association with home values, with a one mill
increase predicting a $42,953-44,463 decrease in home values. This (seemingly unrealistic, in
terms of magnitude) result could perhaps be the result of millage rate having a significant
correlation with other unobserved time-varying city characteristics.
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population densities and taxable property values would suggest higher potential per
capita flood insurance savings from participation and thus a greater incentive to
participate. Meanwhile, the finding that CRS program participation is associated
with higher median incomes follows Fan and Davlasheridze (2016), who find that
the willingness to pay for CRS activities is higher among wealthier households.
Higher citywide median incomes also suggest lower unemployment and crime
rates, following a common negative association between crime and income in the
empirical literature (e.g. Patterson, 1991) and my own findings of a -0.38
correlation (significant at the 1% level) between median income and unemployment
rate.16 Following Li and Landry (2018), lower rates of crime and unemployment
are in turn associated with more mitigation activities, as communities face fewer
“competing priorities” in the form of crime or economic development issues that
may crowd out concerns related to the risks of future flood and disaster events.
Among program participating cities, the localities investing the most in
“active” CRS measures are those with larger populations, more land area in flood
zones, greater inequality, and lower population densities, taxable values, millage
rates, and median incomes. The negative associations between density and score
and tax value and score could be explained if “active” CRS activities (e.g. open
space preservation, stricter building codes) become more expensive with more
people and development, with the higher costs outweighing benefits from higher
per capita flood insurance savings and lower expected flood losses. This aligns
with Sadiq and Noonan (2015), who find that the communities likeliest to be
responding to the incentive structure of the CRS program are those with lower
densities and property values – these communities may have moderate flood risks
that can be addressed through lower-cost mitigation measures, while the mitigation
costs for denser communities may outweigh the immediate flood insurance
discount incentives offered by the program. These results also suggest that
communities are not hindered by less financial capacity (in the form of lower
taxable values) in their ability to make CRS investments, but these communities’
lower baseline millage rates also suggest that they may have more room to raise tax
rates to fund investments. Meanwhile, the negative association with median
income could be the result of property costs being lower in the highest flood risk
cities. Along the lines of Husby et al. (2018), this flood risk discount would attract
lower income households willing to make a tradeoff between lower property costs
but higher flood risks. At the same time, these low property values may also attract
high income households with the means to self-insure against flood losses or afford

16

I exclude unemployment rate from my (2) series regressions due to this high correlation,
selecting median income as my preferred indicator of community socio-economic wellbeing.
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the high costs of building elevated, flood-proof homes,17 providing a possible
explanation for the positive association between inequality and score.18 This
follows Noonan and Sadiq (2018), who find that CRS-participating communities
attract both poor and wealthy households. Finally, lower millage rates may also be
reflective of cities having fewer competing priorities (e.g. in the form of high
policing or economic development expenditures) and thus a greater capacity to
invest in flood risk mitigation.
The characteristics of the cities that made the largest increases in score
differ from those that simply had the highest scores from 2009-2018, with less land
area in flood zones, lower inequality, and higher debt loads predicting large score
changes. One explanation could be that lower flood risk cities (as proxied by flood
zone %) are “catching-up” to higher risk cities that have already taken mitigation
measures. The positive association with debt suggests that financial capacity again
does not appear to be a limiting factor for cities making investments in CRS
measures. Meanwhile, the results in this case for inequality align with a classic
result in the public economics literature, whereby more homogenous cities devote
more spending to “productive” public goods (e.g. Alesina et al., 1999).
Across both “active” score analyses, two further conclusions can be made:
while both the number of owner-occupied homes per capita and the number of
1980-90 flood claims are significant predictors of program participation, neither is
a driving force of higher scores, suggesting that historic flood claims are not strong
predictors of flood risk mitigation today and that owner-occupiers are not
necessarily more engaged in flood risk mitigation issues. Overall, the CRS
program appears to be adequately targeting and incentivizing some higher flood
risk communities to participate and invest in “active” mitigation measures, and
financial constraints in the form of lower median incomes, lower taxable values,
and higher debt loads do not appear to be a hindrance to investment. However,
denser communities appear to be investing less in these measures, which suggests
that cities with higher mitigation costs are not being adequately targeted and
incentivized by the program.
Given the incentive structure of the CRS program, the effects from
participation on a home’s value (if any) would be expected to come through two
routes: flood insurance savings and lower expected flood losses. Combining the
average class ranking of “7” for cities in my dataset, an average nationwide NFIP
flood insurance premium of $642 (Insurance Information Institute, 2019), and a 515% discount on flood insurance premiums (depending on a home’s location) for
Anecdotally, many Florida coastal communities are increasingly a “mishmash” between older,
ground-level (and cheaper) bungalows and newer, elevated (and expensive) mansions, providing
support for this “flood zone-driven inequality” hypothesis.
18
There is a positive correlation of 0.29 between Gini index and flood zone % (significant at the
1% level), providing some further evidence for this “flood zone-driven inequality” hypothesis.
17
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properties in CRS class 7 communities (FEMA, 2017), the discounted lifetime
flood insurance savings (assuming a 2% interest rate and a 50 year home lifespan)
would range from $1,009 to $3,026 for a city that enters the CRS program.
The real-world analysis of CRS participation on homes values appears less
clear-cut, with statistically insignificant findings. Program participation is
associated with a $3,579 increase in home values (1.3% of the median home value
in the average city), with the 95% confidence interval extending from -$16,718 to
$23,876. Although this $3,579 finding is insignificant, it does appear to be within
the realm of possibility, given the above (conservative) approximation of an
average flood-insurance-carrying-home’s lifetime premium savings. There is
evidence suggesting that housing markets in wealthier cities value the program
more, with both higher magnitude and higher percentage effects on home prices in
higher median income communities. This provides further evidence that CRS
program participation is a normal good and aligns with Fan and Davlasheridze
(2016), who find that the willingness to pay for CRS activities is higher among
wealthier households.
Meanwhile, results for active CRS scores show a significant and negative
association with home values in the average Florida municipality, with some
evidence for less negative (or positive) effects on home values in higher flood risk
and higher income communities. These counterintuitive results – at least when
considered within this paper’s theoretical framework – could be explained in two
ways: either the marginal costs of mitigation, above and beyond any increases in
millage rates (e.g. non-property tax fees, such as stormwater fees, or simply the
inconvenience of construction), outweigh the marginal (perceived) benefits of flood
risk mitigation measures, or active mitigation measures (such as new stormwater
systems or higher seawalls) are a “risk signal”, reminding residents and visitors of
the risks of living in low-lying or coastal areas (and perhaps keeping away new
homebuyers). This would align with Gibson et al. (2019), who find that belief
updating in response to new risk signals (in the form of updated flood maps or flood
events) drives down affected home prices. New flood protection infrastructure –
and any associated town hall meetings and public debates – could play a role akin
to new flood maps or flood events.
6.1.

Limitations

This analysis misses one perhaps crucial aspect of the CRS program:
cooperation between cities and within counties on issues pertaining to flood risk
mitigation. Specifically, the part (2) regressions assume that individual
governments act independently of one another. However, in the context of flood
risk mitigation, it is probable that there do exist interjurisdictional spillovers –
towns may share best practices and human capital, and one town’s actions may
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induce a neighboring town to follow in its stead. Furthermore, Florida county
governments are powerful entities and are also able to participate in the CRS
program. Some county risk mitigation measures (e.g. county-wide flood risk
studies) could inform or directly impact city-level activities within the county. Both
factors suggest that spatial autocorrelation could be a source of bias in my part (2)
results.
7. Conclusion
Floods are the costliest natural disasters in the United States, and rising seas,
more frequent and severe storms, and more intensive floodplain development will
only increase the human and economic toll from flooding in coming decades
(Tebaldi et al., 2012; Patricola & Wehner, 2018; Li & Landry, 2018). Given the
uncertainties and complexities of climate and flood risks, planning for, mitigating,
and adapting to these risks falls into the hands of local communities. Determining
the extent to which local governments are wary of and responding to the risks of
climate change, the factors that are driving some (and not others) to proactively
invest in risk mitigation, and the degree to which housing markets are responding
to these investments is critical for understanding the broader socioeconomic
consequences of climate change. To what extent will the policy mechanisms in
place serve to accentuate (or mitigate) the welfare costs of climate change?
In seeking to answer this question, I study flood risk mitigation investments
among Florida cities and towns from 2009-2018 and their association with home
values. Florida’s unique vulnerability to rising sea levels and stronger and more
severe hurricanes (U.S. EPA, 2016) makes the state a prime setting for a study on
climate risks, and my study period – a decade that saw a large increase in flood
events and media attention to climate change (FEMA, 2019; Guertin, 2019) – adds
a new dimension to the existing literature on FEMA’s Community Rating System
(CRS). Using regression analysis, I find that investments in public flood risk
mitigation are increasing over the study period, with an 11.8% increase in CRS
program participation and a 19.8% increase in average “active” CRS scores. CRS
program participation is associated with more owner-occupiers and higher flood
risk, population densities, and median incomes. Active CRS scores are highest in
cities with more land area in flood zones, higher populations, greater inequality,
and lower population densities, median incomes, and financial capacity, while the
cities with the greatest increases in score over the past decade tend to have less land
area in flood zones and lower inequality. Using panel estimation with city-level
fixed effects, I find that program participation is positively but not significantly
related to median home values, with a point estimate of an increase of $3,580 to
$5,680. Active CRS scores are negatively related: every 100-point increase is
associated with a $6,250 decrease in values in the average community, with
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evidence for less negative (or positive) effects in cities with more land area in flood
zones and higher median incomes.
These results suggest that FEMA’s CRS program is meeting one of its
primary goals: fostering comprehensive floodplain management (FEMA, 2017).
Florida cities and municipalities are, on average, responding to the program’s
incentives, investing more in flood risk mitigation measures, and the program is
adequately targeting some higher flood risk communities, even if they have fewer
financial resources. However, the program does not appear to be adequately
targeting and incentivizing denser communities with potentially higher mitigation
costs to invest in these measures. Finally, housing markets do not appear to value
flood risk mitigation measures, suggesting that the costs of mitigation to local
communities may exceed the (perceived) benefits or that these measures are
themselves indicators of flood risk.
Programs such as the Community Rating System will continue to play a
critical role in guiding and incentivizing local governments to plan for, mitigate,
and adapt to rising flood and climate risks. Further study of the program’s
successes, failures, and impacts, as well as those of comparable programs and
frameworks in nations around the world, is warranted. The changing climate will
not wait.
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The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Community Rating System
(CRS) revised its scoring system in 2013. The new system reweighed certain
“active” CRS activities, with no “crosswalk” or equivalence formula. Communities
gradually transitioned to the new system as they received verification visits after
the changes were made effective in the Spring of 2013 (FEMA, 2017). My CRS
scores dataset (extending from 2009-2018) thus includes scores for cities from both
the old scoring system and the new system, with cities transitioning to the new
system at various points in time after 2013 (as of 2018, there are still a few cities
scored on the old system).
To “unify” scores from these two disparate scoring systems, I first construct
a “Predicted Active CRS Score” to transition scores under the new system to the
old scoring system based on a regression of “Old Active CRS Score” on “New
Active CRS Score.” The “Predicted Active CRS Score” is equal to 404.760 +
0.476*(“New Active CRS Score”). Next, I construct a “Combined Active CRS
Score”, bringing together “Old Active CRS Scores” with the “Predicted Active
CRS Scores.” Figure A.1 plots the “Old”, “New”, and “Combined” Active CRS
Scores. Figure A.2 plots the distribution of the “Old Active CRS Score”; Figure
A.3 the distribution of the “New Active CRS Score”; Figure A.4 the distribution
of the “Predicted Active CRS Score.”
Figure A.1.
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Figure A.2.

Figure A.3.
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Figure A.4.

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2020

43

